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ABSTRACT 
 
We extend the U.S. bank M&As literature by examining bidder announcement abnormal 
returns in deals involving both public and private targets over a 32-years examination period. 
Our main findings document the existence of a listing effect in our sample. Banks gain when 
they acquire private firms and lose when they acquire public firms. Gains in private offers are 
even higher when bidders employ financial advisors, whereas the opposite is true for public 
deals. We argue that this adverse advisor effect relates to the different levels of information 
asymmetry between public and private targets. Our results remain robust when we control for 
usual determinants of bidder abnormal returns, such as the method of payment, size, or relative 
size and when we control for sample selection and endogeneity problems. 
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1. Introduction 
The U.S. banking industry has experienced intense consolidation in the previous decades. 
Financial innovation and deregulation fostered successive waves of bank mergers and 
acquisitions (M&As). To date, empirical research fails to provide conclusive evidence that the 
U.S. bank mergers create value for the bidding firms' shareholders. Cornett and De (1991), 
Houston and Ryngaert (1994), DeLong (2001), DeLong and DeYoung (2007), Brewer and 
Jagtiani (2013), among others, find that bidding banks experience negative or insignificant 
abnormal returns around the merger announcement date. Empirical research on the non-
financial M&As documents similar results. However, there is also considerable evidence in the 
non-financial mergers showing that acquirers gain when they buy private firms and lose when 
they buy public firms (Chang, 1998; Fuller et al., 2002; Officer et al., 2009; Netter et al., 2011; 
Arikan and Stulz, 2016; Brander and Egan, 2017). This phenomenon is usually referred to as 
the “listing effect” (Faccio et al., 2006), and many studies investigate this issue in the context 
of information asymmetry theory (for an insightful summary see Tanna and Yousef, 2019). 
In the case of M&As, information asymmetry can be two-sided, since both bidders and 
targets may have private information on their own firm value (Eckbo, 2009). Bidders can limit 
the degree of asymmetric information regarding their value by paying with cash (Eckbo et al., 
1990), while target information asymmetry can be mitigated in various ways. In particular, 
bidding firms may pay a lower purchase price to avoid the risk of inaccurately valuing the 
target (Makadok and Barney, 2001), or they might choose to pay with stock to share with the 
target firms’ shareholders the risk of target overvaluation (Hansen, 1987; Finnerty et al., 2012). 
An additional way to limit the amount of the asymmetric information regarding the target 
firms’ value is using financial advisors (Officer, 2007). In fact, the choice of a financial advisor 
benefits bidders most when target information asymmetry is high (Graham et al., 2017). 
Financial advisors use their expertise in order to collect superior information for the potential 
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targets and locate any synergetic benefits (Servaes and Zenner, 1996). As suggested by Capron 
and Shen (2007), the use of this superior information should create more shareholder value in 
acquisitions of private targets than in those of public targets. Building on these arguments, we 
expect that any advisor effect should be more pronounced in acquisitions of private firms, 
where information regarding the target is not widely available. Therefore, the use of financial 
advisors by bidders may at least explain part of the return differential between public and 
private offers.  
While information asymmetries are endemic to all types of deals and industries, this problem 
might be more severe in private offers because private targets are more opaque than public 
targets (Officer et al., 2009). Moreover, this issue might be more relevant in banking for two 
reasons. First, the majority of U.S. bank M&As involves unlisted targets. Second, the valuation 
of private banks is subject to severe information asymmetries (Flannery et al., 2004). 
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we examine whether there is listing effect in our 
sample of banking acquisitions. Second, we investigate whether and to what extent the use of 
financial advisors can explain the difference in market reaction between public and private 
offers. To address our research questions, we use a large and comprehensive sample of 2,008 
completed M&As of public and privately held targets by U.S. banks, announced between 1984 
to 2015. At the univariate level, our findings indicate the existence of a listing effect in our 
sample. In addition, we find that bidders of private targets experience positive announcement 
abnormal returns when they choose to employ a financial advisor, while in public deals, the 
use of a financial advisor is associated with negative abnormal returns. 
We conduct regression analysis to account for any confounding effects that may impact our 
results. Particularly, we control for method of payment, and other possible determinants of 
bidder gains such as size, and pre-merger performance. We also control for bidder-specific 
heterogeneity by adding bidder fixed effects in our regressions (Golubov et al., 2015). 
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Collectively, the results support our conjecture that the use of financial advisor relates to higher 
bidder abnormal returns in acquisitions of private targets. Interestingly, this positive advisor 
effect is stronger for deals advised by less prestigious advisors. 
We employ two robustness checks to alleviate any endogeneity concerns. First, we use the 
propensity score matching approach, to examine whether selection bias could explain the 
listing effect in our sample. Second, we also account for the endogenous nature of the financial 
advisor choice using the two-stage procedure of Heckman (1979). We find no issues associated 
with self-selection sample, which indicates that our baseline regression analysis is statistical 
meaningful. 
Finally, we explore whether other potential explanations for the listing effect may impact 
our results, such as the liquidity discount in private offers (Officer, 2007), the improved 
corporate governance of the post-crisis period (Alexandridis et al., 2017), or the monitoring 
hypothesis (Chang, 1998). We do not find evidence to support these assumptions, a fact which 
highlights the need to study banking acquisitions separately from other industries. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. 
Section 3 details the data collection for the empirical analysis. Sections 4 present our main 
empirical results. Section 5 deals with endogeneity issues, and Section 6 presents additional 
robustness checks. Section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Theoretical framework and motivation 
2.1. Listing effect and information asymmetry 
There is a wide literature in the non-financial M&As, which examines the relationship 
between bidder returns, and the target firms’ listing status (Chang, 1998; Fuller et al., 2002; 
Moeller et al., 2004; Faccio et al., 2006; John et al., 2010; Netter et al., 2011; Arikan and Stulz, 
2016; Brander and Egan, 2017). Collectively, these studies document that in public offers, 
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acquiring firm realize negative, or at best zero announcement abnormal returns, while in private 
offers abnormal returns are positive. The relevant literature attempts to explain this 
phenomenon under the asymmetric information perspective (Officer et al., 2009). 
Information asymmetry is associated with the degree of information availability (Luypaert 
and Van Caneghem, 2017). In an M&As transaction, information asymmetry can be two-sided, 
because both the bidder and the target may have information regarding their valuation that they 
do not convey to the other party (Hansen, 1987). One possible way to resolve this information 
asymmetry problem is to choose the appropriate method of payment (Eckbo et al., 1990). In 
fact, bidders who pay in cash avoid their misevaluation of their own stock, while bidders who 
pay with stock may reduce the cost of overpayment arising from the lack of information 
regarding the target firm’s value (Eckbo, 2009). 
The effect of bidder information asymmetry on announcement period returns is based on 
the overvaluation hypothesis of Leland and Pyle (1977) and Myers and Majluf (1984). 
According to this hypothesis, managers of acquiring firms will be inclined to pay with stock 
only if they believe that their firm is overvalued. Therefore, equity payments send a negative 
sign to the market regarding the acquiring firm’s valuation, which translates to negative 
abnormal returns (Travlos, 1987). However, the relative degree of information asymmetry 
between the acquiring and the target firm may also have an impact on merger gains (Finnerty 
et al., 2012). In the case of private offers for example, target information asymmetry is expected 
to be high, since privately-owned firms disclose less information to the markets (Reuer and 
Ragozzino, 2008; Tanna and Yousef, 2019). To account for this information unavailability, 
acquiring firms could force private targets to accept a discount in the offer premium (Makadok, 
and Barney, 2001). Alternatively, acquiring firms may choose to pay with stock to mitigate 
information asymmetry regarding the target firm’s valuation. In fact, evidence along these lines 
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shows that in private offers, stock payments are associated with higher abnormal returns 
(Chang, 1998; Fuller et al., 2002; Netter et al., 2011). 
2.2. Financial advisors and information asymmetry 
In the context of information asymmetry theory, we propose that the use of financial advisor 
might help bidding firms alleviate concerns regarding the target firms’ valuation. Officer 
(2007) argues that financial advisors may limit the amount of target information asymmetry 
for bidding firms. Based on this argument, we expect the advisor effect to be more pronounced 
in private offers relative to public ones since target information asymmetry is higher in the 
former deals relative to the latter ones. Private firms have more control over the information 
they convey to the market, whereas for public targets, the market for corporate control serves 
as an asset valuation and information-processing mechanism (Capron and Shen, 2007). In 
addition, high target information asymmetry in private offers creates more opportunities for 
bidders to use superior information and exploit synergetic benefits (Makadok and Barney, 
2001). Financial advisors, as experts in information processing, may be more capable in 
identifying such synergetic benefits, rather than the bidding firm alone. By contrast, exploiting 
superior information in public offers is less likely, since information on public firms is widely 
available due to regulatory disclosure requirements, analysts’ coverage and press releases 
(Feito-Ruiz et al., 2014). 
There are several studies that examine the relationship bidder gains and financial advisors 
under the information asymmetry perspective. In their early study, Servaes and Zenner (1996) 
found that financial advisors are used in more complex transactions that are characterized by 
significant asymmetric information. On this end, acquirers of more opaque targets experience 
a larger fraction of total acquisition gains, since they obtain superior information regarding the 
target firm’s value during the due diligence process (Graham et al, 2017). Furthermore, 
6 
 
Chemmanur et al. (2019) indicate that this positive advisor effect in announcement abnormal 
returns is more pronounced in more complex and opaque industries. 
Another strand of the literature focuses on the advisors’ reputation in explaining 
announcement abnormal returns. Ismail (2010) suggests that acquiring firms garner higher 
abnormal returns when they employ non-top-tier financial advisors, rather than large 
prestigious investment banks. By contrast, Golubov et al. (2012) document a positive 
relationship between advisor reputation and bidder CARs, after controlling for sample selection 
bias issues. 
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3. Sample description and statistics 
3.1 Merger sample 
We collect merger data from Thomson ONE database.  Our sample consists of all completed 
M&As by U.S. banking firms, with initial bids announced between January 1, 1984 and 
December 31, 2015.1 We retrieve mergers that meet the following criteria: 
1. Bidding firms are commercial banks with a three-digit primary SIC code equal to 602, 
or bank holding companies with a four-digit primary SIC code equal to 6712. 
2. The bidder is publicly traded. The target is either a public firm or a private firm. 
3. All public firms are listed on NYSE, Amex, or Nasdaq. 
4. Bidding firms have available return data on the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP) for at least five days around the merger announcement and COMPUSTAT data 
for the year-end prior to the merger announcement. 
5. The bidder acquired an interest of above 50% in the target firm, raising its interest from 
below 50% to above 50%. 
6. The deal value is disclosed and above $1 million. 
 
The above selection process results in an initial sample of 2,139 M&As, where 817 of the 
targets were listed, and 1,322 were stand-alone private companies. We follow Fuller et al. 
(2002) and we exclude from the sample 103 clustered mergers, where the bidding bank 
acquired more than one target firms within 5 days, in order to isolate the bidder’s abnormal 
return for a specific merger (24 public targets, and 79 private targets). We further eliminate 5 
duplicate listings from the sample (1 public target, 4 private targets). Duplicates are defined as 
instances where the same bidder, target and announcement date are listed more than once in 
the Thomson ONE database.2 Similar to Hagendorff and Vallascas (2011), we also exclude 17 
mergers which involved failing institutions, as reported by Thomson ONE (2 public targets, 
and 15 private targets). Finally, we exclude 6 mergers where data for the method of payment 
 
1 Barnes et al. (2014) suggest that Thomson ONE data (former SDC) are reliable from 1984 and onward while 
early 1980s are not recommended for research.  
2 Duplicates emerge from errors in updating Thomson ONE data. In these cases, when new information is available 
for a M&A transaction, a new record is created in the database while the previous one still exists. 
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are not available (6 private targets). Our final sample consists of 2,008 mergers, where 790 of 
the targets were listed firms, and 1,218 were private firms. 
3.2 Sample statistics 
Table 1 shows the inflation-adjusted (base 2015 dollars) mean value of transaction and the 
number of mergers per year. The merger sample is segmented based on the target firm’s listing 
status. Both the number and the size of M&As do not increase monotonically through time. 
Initially, we observe a sharp increase in merger activity in the 1990s, for both types of mergers. 
This increase is consistent with Mitchell and Mulherin (1996), who document that the 
deregulation wave of the 1990s has spurred intense consolidation in the U.S. banking industry. 
In the new millennium, merger activity experienced a downward trend, and did not peak until 
the mid-2000s. Further, the 2008 financial crisis led to a dramatic decrease in the level of bank 
M&As. However, in the most recent years, bank merger activity exhibits an increasing trend, 
following the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act (Leledakis and Pyrgiotakis, 2019). 
Insert Table 1 here 
Table 2 reports the distribution of our merger sample by target firm’s industry affiliation, 
using 48-industry classifications from Fama and French (1997). Industries definitions are based 
on the four-digit primary SIC codes.3 We report by industry the number of banks making 
successful bids for all types of targets, and we further divide the sample based on the target 
firm’s listing status. As expected, almost the entire sample (98.95%) involves targets within 
the financial industry, whereas most deals (90.04%) concern bank-to-bank mergers. 
Insert Table 2 here 
Table 3 provides additional data describing the sample. All variables are defined in the 
Appendix. Panel A of Table 3 reports the mean and median (in brackets) values for bidder-
 
3 Primary SIC codes denote the primary line of business for a company. However, up to ten different SIC codes 
may be assigned to each firm, based on the lines of business the company is involved. Therefore, a target firm in 
our sample may be characterized a bank by its primary SIC code, but it could also engage in trading, insurance, 
or real estate activities.  
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specific characteristics. In line with the literature on non-financial M&As, the average bidder 
size in public offers is larger compared to the corresponding figure in private offers, both in 
terms of total assets and market value of equity. Further, profitability and equity capitalization 
do not differ across the two subsamples, where bidders of private offers appear to have higher 
idiosyncratic return volatility. 
Panel B of Table 3 reports the mean and median values for the deal-specific characteristics 
of our sample. Not surprisingly, the dollar value of M&As is much larger for listed targets than 
for private targets. In fact, mergers involving public targets are approximately 22 times larger 
compared to those involving private targets. As a result, the relative size of target to bidder is 
significantly higher in public offers. Days to completion serves as a proxy for merger 
complexity (Becher and Campbell, 2005). The length of a merger is larger for public than for 
private offers, suggesting that public deals are more difficult to complete. Following Martin 
(1996), we group the method of payment into three different categories: (1) cash, (2) stock, and 
(3) combination of cash and stock.4 We observe that stock financing is the prevailing method 
of payment for acquisitions of public and private targets. However, bidders in private offers 
use significantly more cash to pay for the acquisition compared to bidders in public deals. 
Finally, banks that buy private firms focus more in intrastate transactions and use the pooling 
accounting method less often to incorporate the target in their books relative to those buying 
public firms. 
To address our research question, we report financial advisor data for the bidding banks of 
our sample. We collect information, from Thomson ONE database, on whether any advisors 
were used by the bidding firm, number of advisors used and advisor’s full name. From our 
entire sample of 2,008 M&As, we identified 983 mergers with complete information about 
 
4 Cash payments include combinations of cash, debt, or liabilities. Stock payments include financing with common 
stock or combinations of common stock and options or warrants. Combo financing includes combinations of cash, 
common stock, debt, preferred stock, convertible securities and methods classified as “other consideration” by 
Thomson ONE database. 
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bidder financial advisors (540 public targets, and 443 private targets). Out of the 983 sampled 
deals, 796 were advised by at least one investment bank, and 187 deals did not involve any 
financial advisors on the part of the bidder (in-house deals). 
We also control for the financial advisor’s reputation, to test whether top-tier investment 
banks are perceived to provide better services in bank acquirers than non-top-tier advisors. 
Hence, we download financial advisors league tables from Thomson ONE database for deals 
announced and completed during the period January 1984 to December 2015. The rankings are 
based on the dollar value of transaction handled by the advisor during the sample period. 
Interestingly, the top-11 advisors are the same in both announced and completed deals’ 
rankings (see Table A1 in the Appendix A for the review process). Following Fang (2005), we 
classify advisors into two tiers: the top-8 investment banks are defined as “top-tier” and all 
other financial advisors as “non-top-tier”. The top-8 financial advisors are Goldman Sachs & 
Co, Morgan Stanley, Bank of America Merrill Lynch, JP Morgan, Citi, Credit Suisse, Barclays, 
and Lazard. Most of these investment banks appear in league tables of prior studies (Rau, 2000; 
Hunter and Jagtiani, 2003; Golubov et al., 2012). Hence, we suggest that financial advisors’ 
reputation is relatively stable overtime. 
In order to correctly assign the reputation of each financial advisor, we follow Golubov et 
al. (2012), and we account for the M&As between financial advisors. For example, Bank of 
America was not a top-tier financial advisor prior to the acquisition of Merrill Lynch in 2008. 
Hence, mergers advised by Bank of America before 2008 are classified as advised by a non-
top-tier financial advisor. Finally, in case a bidding bank had employed multiple financial 
advisors, the deal is classified as advised by a top-tier advisor if at least one of the advisors 
belongs to the top-8 group (Servaes and Zenner, 1996). 
Insert Table 3 here 
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4. Main empirical results 
4.1. Univariate analysis 
As a first step in our empirical analysis, we use the standard event study methodology, 
outlined by Brown and Warner (1985), to evaluate bidder gains around the merger 
announcement dates. We estimate cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) over a five-day event 
window centered on the announcement date using the market adjusted return model:5 
, , ,i t i t m tAR R R= −  
where Ri,t is the return for stock i on day t and Rm,t is the market return on the CRSP 
NYSE/Amex/Nasdaq value-weighted index on day t. We prefer to follow this approach rather 
than estimating market model parameters over a time interval prior to the merger 
announcement. This enables us to account for the possibility that a bidding bank had announced 
another merger at some point during the estimation period (Fuller et al., 2002).6 We evaluate 
the statistical significance of our results based on the standardized cross-sectional test of 
Boehmer et al. (1991). This procedure corrects for potential increases in the variance of 
abnormal returns, commonly found in event studies. 
Panel A of Table 4 presents the mean CARs for bidding banks classified by the target firm’s 
listing status. For the entire sample of 2,008 deals, bidder abnormal returns are negative 
(−0.22%) and statistically significant at the one percent level. In public offers, bidders realize 
negative CAR of −1.45%, statistically significant at the one percent level, a finding which is 
consistent with prior empirical work (Cornett and Tehranian, 1992; DeLong and DeYoung, 
2007; Brewer and Jagtiani, 2013). By contrast, in private offers, bidding banks generate a mean 
 
5 We also examined other event windows frequently used in the literature (−1, +1), (−5, +1), (−10, +1), (−1, +10), 
(−10, +10), (−20, +20). Results remained qualitatively similar. Really??? Perhaps we overshoot here, so we say 
there is no variability whether you are close and far away from announcement. So announcement might not be of 
importance. 
6 To ensure robustness of our results we have also estimated CARs using the market model and the mean adjusted 
returns model. Results remained unchanged. 
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abnormal return of 0.57%, which is statistically significant at the one percent level. The 
difference in mean CARs between the two types of deals is also statistically significant at the 
one percent level. This result indicates the existence of a listing effect in our sample. 
4.1.1. Method of payment and bidder CARs 
Panel B of Table 4 presents the mean CARs for bidding banks classified by the target firm’s 
listing status and method of payment. For the entire sample, the use of cash is associated with 
zero abnormal returns, whereas deals financed by any type of stock realize negative and 
statistically significant, at the one percent level, abnormal returns. In public bids, abnormal 
returns for cash offers are again indistinguishable from zero. However, in stock or combination 
offers, abnormal returns are negative (−1.61% and −1.63%, respectively) and statistically 
significant at the one percent level. Therefore, in public bank M&As, the use of equity is 
associated with negative market reaction, consistent with the corresponding evidence from 
non-bank M&As (Travlos, 1987). On the contrary, in private offers, bidder abnormal returns 
are positive and statistically significant at the five percent level regardless of the method of 
payment: cash (0.60%), stock (0.56%), and combination (0.57%). In addition, all differences 
between private and public bids are positive and statistically significant at the ten percent level, 
or better, which suggests that the former deals outperform the latter ones in all cases. 
4.1.2. Financial advisors and bidder CARs 
Panel C of Table 4 presents bidder CARs for the subsample of 983 deals where data on 
financial advisors are available on Thomson ONE database. We split the sample based on 
whether the bidding banks has employed at least one financial advisor (advisor), or not (in-
house). Initially, results for the entire sample are consistent with Servaes and Zenner (1996) 
who find that the use of a financial advisor does not affect announcement abnormal returns. 
Bidder CARs are negative and statistically significant at five percent level or better in both 
types of deals: advisor (−0.59%), in-house (−0.56%). 
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When we breakdown the sample according to the target firms’ listing status, we extract 
different results. In fact, we observe an adverse advisor effect on bidder CARs between public 
and private offers. In public offers, in-house deals experience insignificant abnormal returns, 
whereas deals where advisors where employed realize negative abnormal returns in the order 
of −1.90%, statistically significant at the one percent level. By contrast, in private offers, bidder 
CARs for in-house deals are negative (−0.59%) and statistically significant at the ten percent 
level, while CARs for advised deals are positive (1.47%) and statistically significant at the one 
percent level. It is also noteworthy that for in-house deals, the mean difference between private 
and public offers is not significant at conventional levels, and thus it is the only subsample 
where we do not report a listing effect. When advisors are used, however, private bids 
outperform public bids by as much as 3.37%. The difference between the two types of deals is 
statistically significant at the one percent level. 
In sum, the results of this analysis provide some interesting insights. It appears that the use 
of financial advisor is negatively related to bidder abnormal returns in public offers, whereas 
the opposite is true for private offers. We attribute this adverse effect to the different level of 
information asymmetry between the two types of target firms. For public targets there is widely 
available data and such firms have been extensively scrutinized by regulators, markets, and 
analysts. Therefore, the use of a financial advisor in these cases may not be of added value to 
the bidding banks, if we also consider the fact that advisory fees tend to be higher in public 
deals (Golubov et al., 2012). By contrast, for private firms there is less readily available public 
data, which creates opportunities for financial advisors to extract information (Capron and 
Shen, 2007). That is, financial advisors are able to obtain information beyond the reach of the 
bidding firms (Chahine and Ismail, 2009). In this regard, advisory services may help bidders 
to identify merger-related synergies in private targets, and thus, realize positive abnormal 
returns. 
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Insert Table 4 here 
4.2. Multivariate analysis 
The findings of the previous subsection provide an interesting input for a more in-depth 
analysis of the significant difference in CARs between private and public bids. However, these 
univariate comparisons may be misleading as they do not account for any potential 
confounding effects. For instance, if bidders who employ advisors in public deals are more 
likely to use stock, then the negative advisor effect might reflect a method of payment effect. 
For this reason, we should control for these potentially confounding effects, in order to isolate 
the net effect of financial advisors on bidder CARs. To do so, we conduct several ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regressions, where the dependent variable is the five-day bidder CARs centered 
on the announcement date. In our regressions, we include two different types of covariates: (1) 
bidder-and deal-specific characteristics, and (2) financial advisor data. We run two regressions 
for our entire sample, as well as for the subsamples of public and private deals (one without 
financial advisor data and one with financial advisor data). 
To ensure that the existence of outliers do not influence our results, we winsorize all the 
continuous variables at 1% and 99% level. Further, we control for heteroskedasticity by 
estimating robust standard errors, following White (1980). Correlation coefficients of the 
independent variables indicate a weak to moderate degree of linear relationship among the 
several sets of variables.7 Finally, we also include year fixed effects in all our regressions. 
4.2.1. Regression analysis results 
Table 5 presents the results of our regression analysis. The first 2 columns report results for 
the entire sample. First and more importantly, the coefficient of Private is positive and 
statistically significant at the one percent level in the first two models. The magnitude of its 
 
7 The highest correlation coefficient between continuous variables is 0.45 (in absolute terms) between Bidder size 
and Sigma. 
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coefficient is 1.5% in model 1 and 2.0% in model 2, which suggests that the listing effect is 
robust to the inclusion of all types of variables. In other words, private bids outperform public 
offers, even when we account for factors such as size, method of payment, or advisor use. 
A handful of the remaining control variables bear statistically significant coefficients in our 
regression models. In model 1 the coefficients of Cash and Stock are both positive and 
statistically significant at the ten percent and five percent level, respectively, suggesting that 
all-cash and all-stock offers experience higher abnormal returns compared to mixed offers. 
However, in model 2 only Stock remains statistically significant at the ten percent level. 
Relative size in model 1 is also negative and statistically significant at the five percent level, 
but it loses significance as financial advisor variables are included in the analysis. In model 1, 
consistent with Officer et al. (2009), Sigma has a positive effect on bidder CARs, statistically 
significant, at the one percent level. In unreported results we also included an interaction term 
of Sigma with Stock, with no substantive changes in our results.8 The negative coefficient of 
Pooling, statistically significant at the one percent level, indicates that when bidding banks use 
the purchase method, they experience larger abnormal returns. In model 2, both Advisors and 
Top-tier are insignificant at conventional levels. These results are in line with Servaes and 
Zenner (1996), Rau (2000), Hunter and Jagtiani (2003), and Ismail (2010). Their results suggest 
that neither the use of an advisor nor advisor reputation have any significant effect on 
announcement abnormal returns. 
Models 3 and 4 report regression results for the subset of publicly traded targets. At first, 
the coefficients of Cash and Stock are similar to those reported for the entire sample.  Relative 
size is negative and statistically significant, at the five percent level, in model 3, suggesting that 
abnormal returns decrease when the target is larger relative to the bidder (Jensen and Ruback, 
 
8 Moeller et al. (2007) find a negative relationship between bidder CARs in public bids financed with stock and 
bidder idiosyncratic volatility. 
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1983; Travlos, 1987). Pooling has a negative and statistically significant, at the one percent 
level, coefficient in both models 3 and 4, implying that the purchase method is preferable in 
public bids. Interestingly, Advisors enters the regression with a negative and statistically 
significant coefficient, at the five percent level, in model 4. The magnitude of its coefficients 
indicates that in public offers, bidders who use financial advisors experience −1.7% lower 
abnormal returns than bidders of in-house deals. Top-tier is insignificant at conventional levels, 
which suggests that the advisor reputation does not have an effect on bidder CARs (Ismail, 
2010). 
Models 5 and 6 report results for the acquisitions of private targets.  In model 5, only Sigma 
is significant at the ten percent level, which suggests that bidder-and deal-specific 
characteristics are not strongly related to abnormal returns in private offers. This might reflect 
the difficulty of investors to price a deal that involves a difficult to value private target. 
Consequently, this difficulty may justify the significant role of financial advisors in explaining 
bidder CARs. In fact, Sigma loses significance when we add financial advisor data in model 6, 
whereas Advisors enters the regression with a positive and statistically significant coefficient 
at the one percent level. This finding indicates that the use of financial advisors is beneficial to 
the bidding firms, probably due to their ability to access and evaluate information in private 
offers, which are characterized by high information asymmetry. Therefore, the results of our 
cross-sectional regressions are consistent with our univariate results, which suggest an adverse 
advisor effect between public and private bids. 
Finally, our results do not support the argument that geographical focus is strong 
determinant of bidder CARs in bank M&As (Houston and Ryngaert, 1994; DeLong, 2001). In 
fact, State is positive but statistically insignificant, at conventional levels, in all six models. 
Consistent with Becher and Campbell (2005), we do not find any empirical support that prior 
bidder performance (ROA), affects merger gains. Lastly, the explanatory power of all our 
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models is relatively low, since the Adjusted R2 ranges from 6.20% to 13.10%. Nonetheless, 
this finding is typically observed in regressions of bidder CARs (Fuller et al., 2002; DeLong, 
2003; Moeller et al., 2004). 
Insert Table 5 here 
4.2.2. Bidder fixed effects models 
Thus far, we have identified that when banks acquire private firms, they experience positive 
announcement abnormal returns. In addition, banks that use financial advisors in private offers 
realize even higher announcement abnormal returns. However, it is possible that there could 
be a time-invariant bidder-specific characteristic of acquisition. To control for any unobserved 
bidder specific characteristics, we rerun the baseline regression models for the full sample with 
the inclusion of bidder fixed effects as in Golubov et al. (2015). Bidder fixed effects allow us 
to control for this unobserved heterogeneity across bidding firms, and thus, we can extract more 
robust inferences regarding the advisor effect on bidder CARs. 
Models 1 and 2 of Table 6 replicate the first two models of Table 5 with the addition of 
bidder fixed effects. As these models show, Private is positive and statistically significant at 
the one percent and five percent level, respectively, which suggests that even after controlling 
for the unobserved heterogeneity across biding banks, private offers still outperform public 
deals. In model 1, Cash and Stock are both positive and statistically significant at the one 
percent level. However, in model 2, when we add financial advisor variables, only Cash 
remains statistically significant at the five percent level. Interestingly, in all models of Table 6, 
Cash bears a positive and statistically significant coefficient at the ten percent level or better, 
a finding which supports the overvaluation hypothesis of Myers and Majluf (1984). Results for 
Relative Size and Pooling are similar to the ones reported in the baseline regressions of Table 
5. In model 2, Occasional is also positive and statistically significant at the one percent level, 
indicating that more active bidders tend to perform better in terms of abnormal returns. Again, 
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both Advisors and Top-tier have an insignificant effect on bidder CARs for the entire sample. 
Notably, the inclusion of the bidder fixed effects increases substantially the explanatory power 
of our baseline regression models, since the Adjusted R2 is now 22.10% in model 1 and 24.20% 
in model 2, respectively. 
Next, we also investigate the advisor effect on bidder CARs between public and private 
bids. To fully capture this effect, we create four mutually exclusive interaction variables in the 
spirit of Masulis et al. (2007): Private × Advisors, Private × In-house, Public × Advisors, and 
Public × In-house (the omitted interaction variable). Model 3 of Table 6 presents the results of 
this analysis. In line with our previous findings, the coefficient for Private × Advisors is 
positive and statistically significant at the five percent level, while the coefficient for Public × 
Advisors is negative and statistically significant at the five percent level. Therefore, the adverse 
effect of financial advisors on bidder CARs prevails, even when we control for the bidder-
specific unobserved heterogeneity. 
Finally, we also analyze the effect of advisor reputation on bidder CARs. To do so, we focus 
on the subsample of 796 deals, where at least one advisor was employed by the bidding bank 
(we thus exclude the 187 in-house transactions). In addition, we create four mutually exclusive 
interaction variables: Private × Top-tier, Private × Non-top-tier, Public × Top-tier, and Public 
× Non-top-tier (the omitted interaction variable). Model 4 of Table 6 presents the results of 
this analysis. The positive and statistically significant, at the ten percent level, coefficient of 
Private × Non-top-tier indicates that in private offers the positive advisor effect on bidder 
CARs comes from non-top-tier advisors. This evidence is consistent with the early studies of 
Michel et al. (1991) and McLaughlin (1992) who find that the use of less prestigious advisors 
is associated with higher announcement abnormal returns. 
Insert Table 6 here 
5. Control for endogeneity 
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Inferences from regression results in corporate finance studies may be spurious due to the 
presence of untreated endogeneity in the underlying data generating process. In fact, the above 
analysis assumes that the bidder’s choice to acquire a private rather than a public firm is 
exogenously determined. However, there might be innate differences between bidders of public 
and private targets, which imply that the bidder’s choice could be determined endogenously. 
Furthermore, the same endogeneity concern applies to the advisor choice. In this section 
therefore, we address both endogeneity issues using: (1) the propensity score matching 
approach, and (2) the Heckman’s (1979) two-stage procedure. 
5.1. Propensity score matching and the listing effect 
As we have seen in the summary statistics, bidder- and deal-specific characteristics differ 
significantly between public and private offers. For instance, in private deals, bidders are 
significantly smaller, have higher idiosyncratic volatility, and use cash more frequently as the 
means of payment. All these characteristics are associated with higher announcement abnormal 
returns (Travlos, 1987; Moeller et al., 2004; Officer et al., 2009). Therefore, it is likely that the 
difference in CARs between private and public offers relates to these differences, and it is not 
a direct consequence of the target firms’ listing status. On the one hand, using control variables 
in the cross-sectional regressions helps alleviating this problem. On the other hand, if the 
comparison groups have poor distributional overlap in their characteristics, then the linear 
regressions are not the optimal solution to capture the observed heterogeneity (Heckman et al., 
1998). For this reason, we use the propensity score matching (PSM) approach, as in 
Alexandridis et al. (2017), and Leledakis and Pyrgiotakis (2019). 
To implement our matching strategy, we run two probit models to estimate the probability 
of a deal to involve a private target (propensity score). The first model is for the entire sample 
of 2,008 observations and the second for the subsample of 983 where financial advisor 
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information where available on Thomson ONE.9 In this empirical specification, private deals 
are the treated group, and public deals constitute the control group. Then, we estimate 
propensity scores for each model, and we use them to match our treated and control groups 
according to the nearest neighbor matching approach (one-to-one).10 Finally, we compute the 
difference in bidder CARs between treated and control groups. In the literature, this difference 
is presented as the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT). 
The results of the probit models provide us with some interesting insights. As shown in 
Panel A of Table 7, there are several significant variables, statistically significant at the ten 
percent level or better, that determine the probability for a deal to involve a private target. More 
specifically, private deals are more likely to be financed by cash, and they are also less likely 
to be intrastate. Further, bidders of private targets are more likely to be smaller, and private 
targets also tend to be smaller relative to their bidders. Also, private deals need less time to be 
completed. Finally, the negative coefficient of Advisors, statistically significant at the one 
percent level, suggests that bidders in private offers employ financial advisors less often than 
bidders in public deals. The Pseudo R2 is 27.1% in model 1, and 29.7% in model 2, respectively. 
In Panel B of Table 7, we present the results for the ATTs. Apparently, bidder abnormal 
returns for private deals are higher than bidder CARs in PSM-matched public deals. When we 
do not account for financial advisors, the difference between private and PSM-matched public 
deals is 1.17%, statistically significant at the five percent level. However, when we do account 
for financial advisors, the difference in CARs between private and PSM-matched public deals 
increases to 2.11%, statistically significant at the one percent level. This finding is consistent 
with our prediction for the added value of advisors in private offers. Overall, unless there are 
 
9 Equity-to-assets is not used an independent variable in our probit models, since it worsens the quality of matching 
between private and public offers. Its exclusion ensures that our treated and control groups are adequately balanced 
in their covariates. 
10 Matching is done with replacement due to the limited number of control observations. For robustness, we have 
also more than one neighbors. Result remained similar. 
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important observable characteristics not included in the probit models, we can conclude that 
private offers outperform very similar public deals in terms of bidder CARs, and this 
outperformance is relatively robust to any observed heterogeneity issues. 
Insert Table 7 here 
5.2. Controlling for endogeneity in the advisor choice 
It should be emphasized that the documented advisor effect on bidder CARs is based on two 
assumptions: (1) the bidders’ choice to employ a financial advisor is exogenously determined, 
and (2) the bidders’ choice to employ a top-tier financial advisor is exogenously determined. 
However, it is likely that there are some persistent bidder- and deal-specific characteristics that 
influence the choice to use a financial advisor, or the choice to use a top-tier financial advisor 
rather than a non-top-tier financial advisor. In this case, both choices could be correlated with 
certain bidder- and/or deal-specific characteristics, and as a result, our OLS regression models 
would produce spurious estimates. To address this sample selection issue, we employ 
Heckman’s (1979) two-stage procedure, using the inverse Mills ratio. 
To account for the endogenous nature of both the advisor choice and the advisor reputation, 
we implement this two-stage procedure two times. At first, we conduct the first-stage equation 
of the Heckman’s procedure using a probit model. The dependent variable of this model equals 
one for deals where the bidder has employed at least one financial advisor, and zero for in-
house transactions. From this stage, we construct the inverse Mills ratio that we add as an 
additional independent variable in the second-stage equation. In the second-stage equation, the 
dependent variable is the five-day bidder CARs, and the analysis is done only for the subsample 
of deals involving a financial advisor. Then, we repeat this analysis for the sample of the 796 
deals where at least one advisor was used. In this case, the first-stage equation is a probit model, 
where the dependent variable equals one for deals advised by top-tier advisors, and zero for 
deals advised by non-top-tier advisors. Finally, the second-stage equation refers only to deals 
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advised by top-tier advisors. The coefficients we obtain from both second-stage regressions are 
corrected for the sample selection bias (Doukas et al., 2014). 
Table 8 presents the results for this analysis. According to the probit model 1, there are many 
variables that determine the acquirer’s decision to employ a financial advisor. More precisely, 
larger, better-capitalized, and less profitable bidders are more likely to employ a financial 
advisor in their acquisitions. In addition, intrastate deals and deals that involve public targets 
are associated with higher probability of financial advisor use. In contrast, financing the deal 
purely with cash or stock translates to lower probability of financial advisor use. Relative size 
has a positive impact, statistically significant at the one percent level, on the bidders’ choice to 
employ a financial advisor. Both Pooling and Occasional have negative coefficients, 
statistically significant at the five percent and one percent level, respectively. The Pseudo R2 
of the first-stage equation indicates that our probit models explain up to 30.50% of the bidders’ 
choice to employ a financial advisor in their acquisitions. Model 3 presents the results of the 
probit model for the advisor reputation. It appears that largest, less-capitalized banks who buy 
larger targets are more likely to employ a top-tier financial advisor. The Pseudo R2 of the first-
stage equation indicates that the model explains up to 33.50% of the bidder choice between a 
top-tier and a non-top-tier advisor. 
The most important part of this analysis derives from the second-stage equations. In fact, in 
both models 2 and 4, the coefficient of Inverse Mills ratio is statistically insignificant at 
conventional levels. This finding means the self-selection bias is not an issue in our sample, 
and as such, the regression coefficients in Tables 5 and 6 should be considered reliable. 
Therefore, we can conclude that the use of a financial advisor (and particularly a non-top-tier 
advisor) is associated with higher bidder announcement CARs in private offers. 
Insert Table 8 here 
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6. Additional robustness checks 
In the non-financial literature, there are several explanations for the higher bidder abnormal 
returns in private offers compared to public offers (Faccio et al., 2006; John et al., 2010). For 
this reason, we present various additional robustness tests to ensure the validity of our results. 
In particular, we examine whether other alternative explanations of the listing effect can 
influence our findings. 
6.1. Liquidity discount in acquisition premiums 
Officer (2007) suggests that the listing effect can be attributable to lower acquisition prices 
for private targets. More precisely, the author argues that due to liquidity constraints, 
acquisition premiums for private targets should be lower than for public targets. Consequently, 
lower premiums should result in higher bidder abnormal returns. To test this hypothesis, we 
obtain data on acquisition multiples (available for both public and private targets) from 
Thomson ONE database. In line with Gupta and Misra (2010), we use the ratio of deal value 
to the book value of target’s equity.11 We are able to retrieve acquisition multiple data for 1,040 
deals (762 public and 278 private). 
Panel A of Table 9 shows the mean value of our acquisition multiple for both public and 
private offers. First, we report raw multiple data, as obtained by the database. We observe that 
the values are similar to those reported by Gupta and Misra (2010), but the mean difference 
between the two types of deals is insignificant at conventional levels. However, as Officer 
(2007) indicates, inferences from comparing raw acquisition multiple data may be biased, due 
to the different characteristics between public and private offers. To address this issue, we 
employ the propensity score matching approach of Table 7. This allows us to compute the 
difference in acquisition multiples between private offers and PSM-matched public deals.12 
 
11 We also examine (but not report) the other 3 acquisition multiples outlined by Officer (2007) and find similar 
results. 
12 Matching with replacement produces 146 matches. Our results remain similar if we match without replacement 
or if we use more than 1 neighbors in our matching approach. 
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Our findings indicate that there are no significant differences in acquisition multiples between 
private and similar public deals. Therefore, these findings indicate that our results are less likely 
to be driven by acquisition discounts for private targets. 
6.2. Leakage of information 
In the M&As literature, some authors suggest that merger gains may be capitalized before 
the official merger announcement. For example, Schipper and Thompson (1983) find 
significant bidder gains in the pre-acquisition period and attribute their findings to potential 
leakage of information. In this case, measuring abnormal returns at the announcement date may 
underestimate the market reaction for the transaction, since such leakage would show-up in the 
pre-announcement bidder returns. Hypothetically, this is a more likely scenario in deals than 
involve two listed firms, where information regarding the merging firms is more widely 
available.  In that event, the documented listing effect on the merger announcement date may 
be overestimated, since merger gains for public offers might have been impounded in the stock 
price days before the official announcement. To account for this possibility, we examine if 
there is a run-up in the bidding firm’s stock price, emanating from any potential leakage of 
information regarding the acquisition. Following Faccio et al. (2006) we compute pre-
announcement abnormal returns over the window (−15, −3), and we present the results in Panel 
B of Table 9. Over this interval, abnormal returns are positive for all types of mergers, but 
marginally significant only for the private offers. More precisely, bidder CARs are: 0.10% for 
public targets and 0.46% for private targets, and their difference is insignificant at conventional 
levels. Therefore, these results are inconsistent with the assumption that prior capitalization of 
merger gains account for the listing effect in our sample.13 
6.3. CARs at the completion date 
 
13 We also examine deals that began as a rumor. Thomson ONE identifies a rumor for possible acquisition for 26 
and 9 acquisitions of public and private targets, respectively. Given the small number of deals in each category, it 
is quite unlikely that rumors of acquisitions could explain the listing effect in our sample.  
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The literature on non-financial M&As focuses almost exclusively on announcement period 
returns, a fact which implies that all expected price reactions should occur at the announcement 
of a bid. However, in practice, not all announced mergers are finally completed. An important 
feature of the financial sector is that regulatory approval is mandatory for the completion of a 
transaction. Regulators may reject an application if the acquisition does not satisfy the public 
benefit criteria, or exceed several concentration limits (Desai and Stover, 1985). 
It is therefore likely that the probability of success may influence the market reaction upon 
the announcement of a proposed merger. In fact, the uncertain outcome may induce investors 
to postpone their reaction at a time where the bidder intention to acquire is indeed materialized. 
If the likelihood of an acquisition success is higher for private than for public targets, 
announcement abnormal returns in public bids could be downward biased. In this case, 
abnormal returns at the deal completion date may be higher for public than for private bids. 
Therefore, the listing effect could relate to the difference in the timing of the market reaction 
for the deal, rather than the listing status of the target firm. 
In the spirit of Faccio et al. (2006), we examine the acquisition success rates for the different 
types of deals. To do so, we identify acquisitions that were announced as completed 
transactions at the initial announcement date. From our entire sample of 2,008 completed 
M&As, only 65 deals where announced when completed (1 public target, and 64 private 
targets). Thus, for the remaining 1,943 deals there was uncertainty regarding the successful 
completion of the proposed transaction (789 public targets, and 1,154 private targets). Further, 
we find 199 M&As that were announced but not completed during the examination period (103 
public targets, and 96 private targets). Accordingly, the acquisition success rate for a public bid 
is (789/(789+103)) = 88.45%, while the acquisition success rate for a private bid is 
(1,154/(1,154+96)) = 92.32%. Notably, the difference between the two proportion is 
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statistically significant at the one percent level, using a Chi-square test (χ2 = 9.25). This finding 
suggests that public deals are completed less often compared to private deals. 
At last, we examine whether these differences in acquisition success rate translate into 
differences in bidder abnormal returns around the deal completion date. In line with 
announcement period returns, we estimate bidder CARs over a five-day window, centered on 
the completion date. We include in the analysis only the bidders of the 1,943 M&As in which 
there was uncertainty about the acquisition success, and we present these results in Panel C of 
Table 9. In fact, CARs are positive for both types of mergers, but marginally significant only 
for public offers. More specifically, bidder completion CARs are: 0.32% for public targets and 
0.10% for private targets. These results indicate that market participants do indeed reward 
bidding banks when they complete an acquisition of a public firm. However, the difference 
between the two types of deals is insignificant, suggesting that completion CARs do not offset 
the difference in announcement CARs between public and private bids. 
6.4. Crisis effect on corporate governance 
In a recent study, Alexandridis et al. (2017) find that since 2010, the listing effect has been 
reversed in U.S. M&As. In fact, the authors document that after the 2008 financial crisis, public 
offers generate comparable shareholder value to private ones. Further, they attribute these 
findings to the improvement of the corporate governance mechanisms. 
Based on this argument, the listing effect in our case could reflect the fact that firms with 
better corporate governance tend to buy private firms. In that event, the difference in CARs 
between private and public bids is not a function of the target firm listing status. To test this 
prediction using the arguments of Alexandridis et al. (2017), we examine whether the listing 
effect in our sample has been reversed as a result of the recent financial crisis. We find that 
bidder CARs in both types of deals improve since 2010. However, the differences between 
public and private offers are statistically significant at the one percent level both in the pre-
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2010 and the post-2009 periods (see, Panel D of Table 9).14 Therefore, even if corporate 
governance drives this improvement, the listing effect is still persistent in the acquisitions by 
U.S. banks. 
Insert Table 9 here 
6.5. Limited competition for private targets 
One alternative explanation for the listing effect assumes limited competition for the 
privately held targets, due to the higher costs of obtaining accurate information. In a limited 
competition environment, bidders may realize positive abnormal returns, since the likelihood 
of underpayment is higher (Chang, 1998). In addition, James and Wier (1987), Cornett and De 
(1991), among others, document that the number of bids per target firm (proxy for competition) 
relates to statistically lower announcement returns, since the winning firm might overpay to 
win the bidding war. However, as shown in Table 3, most target firms receive only one public 
bid: public targets (98.10%), and private targets (99.92%). Hence, bidding banks face almost 
no competition in acquiring either public or private targets. It is therefore unlikely that the 
limited competition hypothesis can explain the listing effect in M&As by U.S. banking firms. 
6.6. Monitoring hypothesis 
The monitoring hypothesis outlined by Chang (1998), suggests that when firms pay with 
stock in private offers, target firms’ shareholders become effective monitors of the bidding 
firms’ performance. Evidently, this explanation assumes that private firms are family-owned 
or closely held. However, in our sample, Thomson ONE reports only 3 cases where private 
target firms were family owned.15 It is therefore unlikely that the ownership structure of the 
target firm would have a monitoring effect in the case of M&As by U.S. banks. 
 
 
14 The results are the same even if we start the examination period at 1990, as in Alexandridis et al. (2017). 
15 A target is characterized as “family owned” if at least a family, a group of families, or a non-founding chairman 
controls 20% of the firm. 
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7. Conclusion 
In this paper, we examine bidder abnormal returns in 2,008 completed M&As of publicly 
traded U.S. banking companies announced between 1984 and 2015, as well as the differences 
in stock market reaction between public and private offers. Our findings indicate the presence 
of a listing effect in acquisitions by U.S. banks: bidder announcement CARs in acquisitions of 
privately held companies are significantly larger than in acquisitions of publicly traded firms. 
This listing effect persists through time and is robust to sample selection issues. 
We interpret our results is in the context of information asymmetry theory (Hansen, 1987). 
Officer et al. (2009) finds that when bidders pay with stock, they mitigate target information 
asymmetry, and thus, they enjoy higher announcement abnormal returns in difficult to value 
transactions. We extent this argument by hypothesizing that the use of financial advisors may 
also help bidding banks to extract superior information and realize merger-related synergies, 
especially in the case of private offers, where information regarding the target firm’s value is 
limited. Our results document an adverse effect of financial advisors in public versus private 
offers. In fact, bidders gain when they employ advisors in acquisitions of private firms and lose 
when they do so in acquisitions of public firms. This differential advisor effect between the 
two types of deals holds even when we control for method of payment, and several bidder- and 
deal-specific characteristics that relate to bidder CARs. Finally, we document that the potential 
endogeneity of the advisor’s choice does not impact our findings. 
  
29 
 
References 
Abadie, A., and G. W. Imbens. 2006. “Large Sample Properties of Matching Estimators for 
Average Treatment Effects.” Econometrica 74: 235-267. 
Alexandridis, G., N. Antypas, and N. G. Travlos. 2017. “Value Creation from M&As: New 
Evidence.” Journal of Corporate Finance 45: 632-650. 
Arikan, A. M., and R. M. Stulz. 2016. “Corporate Acquisitions, Diversification, and the Firm's 
Life Cycle.” Journal of Finance 71: 139-194. 
Barnes, B. G., N. L. Harp, and D. Oler. 2014. “Evaluating the SDC Mergers and Acquisitions 
Database.” Financial Review 49: 793-822. 
Becher, D. A., and T. L. Campbell. 2005. “Interstate Banking Deregulation and the Changing 
Nature of Bank Mergers.” Journal of Financial Research 28: 1-20. 
Boehmer, E., J. Masumeci, and A. B. Poulsen. 1991. “Event-Study Methodology under 
Conditions of Event-Induced Variance.” Journal of Financial Economics 30: 253-272. 
Brander, J. A., and E. J. Egan. 2017. “The Winner’s Curse in Acquisitions of Privately-Held 
Firms.” Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 65: 249-262. 
Brewer, E., and J. Jagtiani. 2013. “How Much Did Banks Pay to Become Too-Big-To-Fail and 
to Become Systemically Important?” Journal of Financial Services Research 43: 1-35. 
Brown, S. J., and J. B. Warner. 1985. “Using Daily Stock Returns: The Case of Event Studies.” 
Journal of Financial Economics 14: 3-31. 
Capron, L., and J. C. Shen. 2007. “Acquisitions of Private vs. Public Firms: Private 
Information, Target Selection, and Acquirer Returns.” Strategic Management Journal 
28: 891-911. 
Chahine, S., and A. Ismail. 2009. “Premium, Merger Fees and the Choice of Investment Banks: 
A Simultaneous Analysis.” Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 49: 159-177. 
Chang, S. 1998. “Takeovers of Privately Held Targets, Methods of Payment, and Bidder 
Returns.” Journal of Finance 53: 773-784. 
Chemmanur, T. J., M. Ertugrul, K. Krishnan. 2019. “Is It the Investment Bank or the 
Investment Banker? A Study of the Role of Investment Banker Human Capital in 
Acquisitions.” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 54: 587-627. 
Cornett, M. M., and S. De. 1991. “Common Stock Returns in Corporate Takeover Bids: 
Evidence from Interstate Bank Mergers.” Journal of Banking and Finance 15: 273-295. 
Cornett, M. M., and H. Tehranian. 1992. “Changes in Corporate Performance Associated with 
Bank Acquisitions.” Journal of Financial Economics 31: 211-234. 
DeLong, G. L. 2001. “Stockholder Gains from Focusing versus Diversifying Bank Mergers.” 
Journal of Financial Economics 59: 221-252. 
DeLong, G. L., 2003. “The Announcement Effects of U.S. versus non-U.S. Bank Mergers: Do 
They Differ?” Journal of Financial Research 26: 487-500. 
DeLong, G. L., and R. DeYoung. 2007. “Learning by Observing: Information Spillovers in the 
Execution and Valuation of Commercial Bank M&As.” Journal of Finance 62: 181-
216. 
30 
 
Desai, A. S., and R. D. Stover. 1985. “Bank Holding Company Acquisitions, Stockholder 
Returns, and Regulatory Uncertainty.” Journal of Financial Research 8: 145-156. 
Doukas, J., H. Gonenc, and A. Plantinga. 2014. “Private Acquisition Gains: A Contingent 
Claims Explanation.” European Journal of Finance 20: 1090-1113. 
Eckbo, B. E., R. M. Giammarino, and R. L. Heinkel. 1990. “Asymmetric Information and the 
Medium of Exchange in Takeovers: Theory and Tests.” Review of Financial Studies 3: 
651-675. 
Eckbo, B. E. 2009. “Bidding Strategies and Takeover Premiums: A Review.” Journal of 
Corporate Finance 15: 149-178. 
Faccio, M., J. J. McConnell, and D. Stolin. 2006. “Returns to Acquirers of Listed and Unlisted 
Targets.” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 41: 197-220. 
Fama, E. F., and K. R. French. 1997. “Industry Costs of Equity.” Journal of Financial 
Economics 43: 153-193. 
Fang, L. H. 2005. “Investment Bank Reputation and the Price and Quality of Underwriting 
Services.” Journal of Finance 60: 2729-2761. 
Feito-Ruiz, I., A. I. Fernández, and S. Menéndez-Requejo. 2014. “Determinants of the 
Acquisition of Listed versus Unlisted Firms in Different Legal and Institutional 
Environments.” Applied Economics 46: 2814-2832. 
Finnerty, J. D., J. Jiao, and A. Yan. 2012. “Convertible Securities in Merger Transactions.” 
Journal of Banking and Finance 36: 275-289. 
Flannery, M. J., S. H. Kwan, and M. Nimalendran. 2004. “Market Evidence on the Opaqueness 
of Banking Firms’ Assets.” Journal of Financial Economics 71: 419-460. 
Fuller, K., J. Netter, and M. Stegemoller. 2002. “What Do Returns to Acquiring Firms Tell Us? 
Evidence from Firms That Make Many Acquisitions.” Journal of Finance 57: 1763-
1793. 
Graham, M., T. S. Walter, A. Yawson, and H. Zhang. 2017. “The Value-Added Role of 
Industry Specialist Advisors in M&As.” Journal of Banking and Finance 81: 81-104. 
Golubov, A., D. Petmezas, and N. G. Travlos. 2012. “When It Pays to Pay Your Investment 
Banker: New Evidence on the Role of Financial Advisors in M&As.” Journal of 
Finance 67: 271-311. 
Golubov, A., A. Yawson, and H. Zhang. 2015. “Extraordinary Acquirers.” Journal of Financial 
Economics 116: 314-330. 
Gupta, A., and L. Misra. 2007. “Deal Size, Bid Premium, and Gains in Bank Mergers: The 
Impact of Managerial Motivations.” Financial Review 42: 373-400. 
Gupta, A., and L. Misra. 2010. “Listing Effects and the Private Company Discount in Bank 
Acquisitions.” In Handbook of Quantitative Finance and Risk Management, edited 
by C. F. Lee, A. C. Lee, and J. Lee, 1427-1443. Boston: Springer. 
Hagendorff, J., and F. Vallascas. 2011. “CEO Pay Incentives and Risk-Taking: Evidence from 
Bank Acquisitions.” Journal of Corporate Finance 17: 1078-1095. 
Hansen, R. G. 1987. “A Theory for the Choice of Exchange Medium in Mergers and 
Acquisitions.” Journal of Business 60: 75-95. 
31 
 
Heckman, J. J. 1979. “Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error.” Econometrica 47: 153-
161. 
Heckman, J. J., H. Ichimura, J. Smith, and P. Todd. 1998. “Characterizing Selection Bias Using 
Experimental Data.” Econometrica 66: 1017-1098. 
Houston, J. F., and M. D. Ryngaert. 1994. “The Overall Gains from Large Bank Mergers.” 
Journal of Banking and Finance 18: 1155-1176. 
Hunter, W. C., and J. Jagtiani. 2003. “An Analysis of Advisor Choice, Fees, and Effort in 
Mergers and Acquisitions.” Review of Financial Economics 12: 65-81. 
Ismail, A. 2010. “Are Good Financial Advisors Really Good? The Performance of Investment 
Banks in the M&A Market.” Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting 35: 411-
429. 
James, C. M., and P. Wier. 1987. “Returns to Acquirers and Competition in the Acquisition 
Market: The Case of Banking.” Journal of Political Economy 95: 355-370. 
Jensen, M. C., and R. S. Ruback. 1983. “The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific 
Evidence.” Journal of Financial Economics 11: 5-50. 
John, K., S. Freund, D. Nguyen, and G. K. Vasudevan. 2010. “Investor Protection and Cross-
Border Acquisitions of Private and Public Targets.” Journal of Corporate Finance 16: 
259-275. 
Leland, B. R., and H. E. Pyle. 1977. “Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and 
Financial Intermediation.” Journal of Finance 32: 371-387. 
Leledakis, G. N., and E. G. Pyrgiotakis. 2019. “U.S. Bank M&As in the Post-Dodd–Frank Act 
Era: Do They Create Value?” Journal of Banking and Finance, Forthcoming. 
Luypaert, M., and T. Van Caneghem. 2017. “Exploring the Double‐Sided Effect of Information 
Asymmetry and Uncertainty in Mergers and Acquisitions.” Financial Management 46: 
873-917. 
Makadok, R., and J. B. Barney. 2001. “Strategic Factor Market Intelligence: An Application 
of Information Economics to Strategy Formulation and Competitor Intelligence.” 
Management Science 47: 1621-1638. 
Martin, K. J. 1996. “The Method of Payment in Corporate Acquisitions, Investment 
Opportunities, and Management Ownership.” Journal of Finance 51: 1227-1246. 
Masulis, R. W., C. Wang, and F. Xie. 2007. “Corporate Governance and Acquirer Returns.” 
Journal of Finance 62: 1851-1889. 
McLaughlin, R. M. 1992. “Does the Form of Compensation Matter?: Investment Banker Fee 
Contracts in Tender Offers.” Journal of Financial Economics 32: 223-260. 
Michel, A., I. Shaked, and Y. T. Lee. 1991. “An Evaluation of Investment Banker Acquisition 
Advice: The Shareholders' Perspective.” Financial Management 20: 40-49. 
Mitchell, M. L., and J. H. Mulherin. 1996. “The Impact of Industry Shocks on Takeover and 
Restructuring Activity.” Journal of Financial Economics 41: 193-229. 
Moeller, S. B., F. P. Schlingemann, and R. M. Stulz. 2004. “Firm Size and the Gains from 
Acquisitions.” Journal of Financial Economics 73: 201-228. 
32 
 
Moeller, S. B., F. P. Schlingemann, and R. M. Stulz. 2007. “How Do Diversity of Opinion and 
Information Asymmetry Affect Acquirer Returns?” Review of Financial Studies 20: 
2047-2078. 
Myers, S. C., and N. S. Majluf. 1984. “Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When 
Firms Have Information that Investors Do Not Have.” Journal of Financial Economics 
13: 187-221. 
Netter, J., M. Stegemoller, and M. B. Wintoki. 2011. “Implications of Data Screens on Merger 
and Acquisition Analysis: A Large Sample Study of Mergers and Acquisitions from 
1992 to 2009.” Review of Financial Studies 24: 2316-2357. 
Officer, M. S. 2007. “The Price of Corporate Liquidity: Acquisition Discounts for Unlisted 
Targets.” Journal of Financial Economics 83: 571-598. 
Officer, M. S., A. B. Poulsen, and M. Stegemoller. 2009. “Target-Firm Information 
Asymmetry and Acquirer Returns.” Review of Finance 13: 467-493. 
Rau, P. R. 2000. “Investment Bank Market Share, Contingent Fee Payments, and the 
Performance of Acquiring Firms.” Journal of Financial Economics 56: 293-324. 
Reuer, J. J., and R. Ragozzino. 2008. “Adverse Selection and M&A Design: The Roles of 
Alliances and IPOs.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 66: 195-212. 
Schipper, K., and R. Thompson. 1983. “Evidence on the Capitalized Value of Merger Activity 
for Acquiring Firms.” Journal of Financial Economics 11: 85-119. 
Servaes, H., and M. Zenner. 1996. “The Role of Investment Banks in Acquisitions.” Review of 
Financial Studies 9: 787-815. 
Tanna, S., and I. Yousef. 2019. “Mergers and Acquisitions: Implications for Acquirers’ Market 
Risk.” Managerial Finance 45: 545-562. 
Travlos, N. G. 1987. “Corporate Takeover Bids, Methods of Payment, and Bidding Firms’ 
Stock Returns.” Journal of Finance 42: 943-963. 
White, H. 1980. “A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Direct 
Test for Heteroskedasticity.” Econometrica 48: 817-838. 
 
  
33 
 
Appendix: Variable definitions 
Inverse mill ratio? 
Variables Definition 
Panel A: Deal characteristics 
Private Dummy variable: 1 for acquisitions of privately held targets, and 0 
otherwise. 
State Dummy variable: 1 if both bidder and target are headquartered in the same 
state, and 0 otherwise. 
Cash Dummy variable: 1 when the deal is financed purely with cash, and 0 
otherwise. 
Stock Dummy variable: 1 when the deal is financed purely with stock, and 0 
otherwise. 
Combo  Dummy variable: 1 when the deal is financed with a combination of cash and 
stock, and 0 otherwise. 
Relative size The transaction value divided by the market value equity of the bidding 
company 5 days prior to the merger announcement. 
Pooling Dummy variable: 1 if the bidder had used the pooling accounting method to 
incorporate the target into its books, and 0 otherwise. 
Days to completion The number of calendar days between the announcement date and the 
completion date. 
Transaction value The total amount of consideration offered to the target firm, as reported by 
Thomson ONE database (in million $). 
Panel B: Bidder characteristics 
Total assets The bidding firm’s total assets at year-end prior to the merger announcement 
(in million $). 
Market value of equity The bidding firm’s market value of equity 5 days prior to the merger 
announcement (in million $). 
Bidder size The natural logarithm of the bidding firm’s total assets at year-end prior to 
the merger announcement. 
ROA Bidding firms' return on assets (ROA) at year-end prior to the merger 
announcement. 
Equity-to-assets The ratio of the bidding firms’ common equity to total assets at year-end 
prior to the merger announcement.  
Sigma The standard deviation of the market-adjusted residuals from 210 to 21 days 
prior to the merger announcement.  
Occasional Dummy variable: 1 for bidders who completed at least 2 acquisitions over a 
three-year window, and 0 otherwise. 
Mutual Dummy variable: 1 for bidders who acquired both public and private firms 
during our examination period, and 0 otherwise. 
Panel C: Financial advisor 
In-house Dummy variable: 1 if the bidding firm had not employed any financial 
advisor, and 0 otherwise. 
Advisors Dummy variable: 1 if the bidding firm had employed at least one financial 
advisor, and 0 otherwise. 
Top-tier Dummy variable: 1 for financial advisors that belong to the top-tier group, 
and 0 otherwise. 
Non-top-tier Dummy variable: 1 for financial advisors that belong to the non-top-tier 
group, and 0 otherwise.???  
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Table 1 
Merger size by announcement year and target firm’s listing status 
This table contains means for the total value of consideration paid by the bidder, excluding fees and expenses, 
segmented by year and target firm’s listing status. All values are adjusted for inflation (in 2015 million $). The 
sample consists of all completed M&As by U.S. banking firms, with initial bids announced between January 1, 
1984 and December 31, 2015. Bidders are commercial banks with a three-digit primary SIC code equal to 602, or 
bank holding companies with a four-digit primary SIC code equal to 6712. Targets are comprised of publicly 
traded or privately held firms. Our final sample consists of 2,008 mergers, where 790 of the targets were listed 
firms, and 1,218 were private firms. Merger data are collected from Thomson ONE database. 
 Public  Private    Public  Private  
Year Mean N Mean N  Year Mean N Mean N 
1984 429.613 3 47.851 24  2000 1,972.670 38 47.626 32 
1985 756.003 8 90.589 10  2001 872.118 28 56.250 41 
1986 990.255 10 92.047 31  2002 612.720 17 39.503 25 
1987 1,067.290 16 64.141 33  2003 2,279.310 35 54.819 43 
1988 529.703 6 61.128 17  2004 3,092.060 42 64.876 48 
1989 549.955 18 39.801 32  2005 2,643.280 22 146.115 61 
1990 64.556 8 74.228 23  2006 3,390.290 23 70.395 44 
1991 1,219.650 25 38.740 23  2007 746.984 27 90.926 32 
1992 437.778 32 97.507 33  2008 5,225.920 16 127.439 7 
1993 420.435 42 54.932 77  2009 113.747 5 10.936 3 
1994 330.703 50 53.985 99  2010 403.162 12 18.590 4 
1995 1,486.200 50 29.615 63  2011 170.743 8 35.319 10 
1996 714.209 34 58.584 66  2012 419.317 16 74.815 15 
1997 2,525.900 48 83.744 90  2013 339.411 18 103.108 25 
1998 3,892.700 46 76.029 88  2014 254.808 24 64.390 37 
1999 1,057.700 45 57.812 47  2015 602.002 18 63.555 35 
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Table 2 
Merger Activity by target firm’s 
This table reports, by industry of the target firm, the fraction of sample firms that were acquired from 1984 to 
2015. Bidders are commercial banks with a three-digit primary SIC code equal to 602, or bank holding companies 
with a four-digit primary SIC code equal to 6712. Targets are comprised of publicly traded or privately held firms. 
Target industry data are organized following Fama and French (1997) 48-industry classifications, using four-digit 
Primary SIC codes. Merger data are obtained from Thomson ONE database. 
Target Industry All Public Private 
Personal Services 1 1 0 
Business Services 20 5 15 
Banking 1,808 730 1,078 
Insurance 17 0 17 
Real Estate 2 0 2 
Trading 160 54 106 
Total 2,008 790 1,218 
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Table 3 
Summary statistics by target firm’s listing status. 
This table summarizes means and medians (in brackets) for all M&As of our sample, segmented by the target 
firm’s listing status. The sample consists of all completed M&As by U.S. banking firms, with initial bids 
announced between January 1, 1984 and December 31, 2015. Bidders are commercial banks with a three-digit 
primary SIC code equal to 602, or bank holding companies with a four-digit primary SIC code equal to 6712. 
Targets are comprised of publicly traded or privately held firms. Panel A displays statistics for bidder-specific 
variables. Panel B details statistics for deal-specific variables. All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
Significance for differences in means is based on the t-test, assuming unequal variances. Significance for 
differences in medians is based on the Mann-Whitney test. Significance for differences in proportions is based on 
the Chi-square test. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, 
respectively, using a 2-tail test. 
  All  Public  Private  Private − Public 
Panel A: Bidder characteristics  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Total assets (million $)  24,768.880  42,977.450  12,985.730  −29,991.720*** 
  [4,811.477]  [9,511.236]  [3,281.887]  [−6,229.349]*** 
Market value of equity (million $)  5,653.007  9,965.419  2,855.958  −7,109.461*** 
  [1,032.955]  [2,129.237]  [707.200]  [−1,422.037]*** 
ROA  1.058  1.036  1.073  0.037 
  [1.049]  [1.061]  [1.041]  [−0.020] 
Equity-to-assets  0.087  0.088  0.087  −0.001 
  [0.083]  [0.082]  [0.083]  [0.001] 
Sigma  0.016  0.015  0.017  0.002*** 
  [0.015]  [0.014]  [0.015]  [0.001]*** 
Panel B: Deal characteristics         
Transaction value (million $)  623.141  1,479.740  67.547  −1,412.193*** 
  [59.176]  [203.706]  [32.570]  [−171.136]*** 
Relative Size  0.226  0.351  0.145  −0.206*** 
  [0.100]  [0.166]  [0.071]  [−0.095]*** 
Days to completion  174.279  191.843  162.887  −28.956*** 
  [162.500]  [175.000]  [151.000]  [−24.000]*** 
% of cash deals  21.32  11.39  27.75  16.36*** 
% of stock deals  51.89  59.11  47.21  −11.90*** 
% of combo deals  26.79  29.50  25.04  −4.46** 
% same state deals  49.50  45.44  52.13  6.69*** 
% pooling method  23.31  27.97  20.28  −7.69*** 
% single bidders  98.86  98.10  99.92  1.82*** 
% financial advisor used  80.98  88.70  71.56  −17.14*** 
% top-tier   29.02  38.41  14.83  −23.58*** 
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Table 4 
Bidder cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement date 
This table illustrates the bidder announcement cumulative abnormal returns. The sample consists of all completed 
M&As by U.S. banking firms, with initial bids announced between January 1, 1984 and December 31, 2015. 
Bidders are commercial banks with a three-digit primary SIC code equal to 602, or bank holding companies with 
a four-digit primary SIC code equal to 6712. Targets are comprised of publicly traded or privately held firms. 
Abnormal returns are estimated using the market adjusted returns model for a five-day event In Panel A, we report 
results for the entire sample. In Panel B, results are segmented according to the method of payment. In Panel C, 
results are segmented based on whether the bidder has used a financial advisor or not. Number of observations is 
below the reported CARs. Significance for CARs is based on the standardized cross-sectional test. Significance 
for the mean differences in CARs between private and public offers is based on the t-test assuming unequal 
variances. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, 
using a 2-tail test. 
Panel A: Full sample  All  Public  Private  Private − Public 
All bids  −0.22%***  −1.45%***  0.57%***  2.02%*** 
  2,008  790  1,218   
Panel B: Method of payment  All  Public  Private  Private − Public 
Cash  0.43%  −0.18%  0.60%**  0.78%* 
  428  90  338   
Stock  −0.41%***  −1.61%***  0.56%**  2.17%*** 
  1,042  467  575   
Combo  −0.38%***  −1.63%***  0.57%**  2.20%*** 
  538  233  305   
Panel C: Financial advisor use  All  Public  Private  Private − Public 
In-house  −0.59%**  −0.56%  −0.59%*  −0.03???? 
  187  61  126   
Advisors  −0.56%***  −1.90%***  1.47%***  3.37%*** 
  796  479  317   
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Table 5 
Regression analysis on bidder CARs: Public vs private firms 
The sample includes all completed M&As in U.S. banking with initial bids announced between January 1 1984 
and December 31 2015. The estimation method is OLS. Models 1 and 2 report results for the entire sample, models 
3 and 4 report results for the subsample of public offers and models 5 and 6 report results for the subsample of 
private offers. All independent variables are defined in the Appendix. All continuous variables are winsorized at 
1% and 99% level. Significance is based on White (1980) heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. The t-
statistics are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 
and 0.01 levels, respectively, using a 2-tail test. 
 Full sample   Public   Private 
Variables (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
Constant −0.014 −0.023   −0.021 −0.018   0.000 −0.024 
 (−1.08) (−0.96)   (−0.91) (−0.56)   (0.03) (−0.92) 
Private 0.015*** 0.020***         
 (6.84) (6.06)         
State 0.001 0.005   0.001 0.005   0.001 0.006 
 (0.30) (1.63)   (0.25) (1.10)   (0.35) (1.39) 
Cash 0.005* 0.006   0.011** 0.010   0.003 −0.000 
 (1.94) (1.42)   (2.12) (1.30)   (1.08) (−0.09) 
Stock 0.007** 0.008*   0.008* 0.010*   0.004 −0.001 
 (2.49) (1.87)   (1.88) (1.75)   (1.29) (−0.25) 
Bidder size −0.001 −0.001   −0.001 −0.001   −0.001 −0.001 
 (−1.41) (−0.58)   (−0.52) (−0.33)   (−0.91) (−0.37) 
Relative size −0.010** −0.007   −0.014** −0.006   0.009 0.005 
 (−2.15) (−1.17)   (−2.34) (−0.90)   (0.90) (0.39) 
ROA 0.001 0.000   0.001 −0.005   0.002 −0.001 
 (0.45) (0.07)   (0.22) (−0.95)   (0.38) (−0.11) 
Equity-to-assets 0.030 0.031   0.027 0.010   0.029 0.108 
 (0.58) (0.47)   (0.31) (0.10)   (0.42) (1.27) 
Sigma 0.578*** 0.332   0.583 0.117   0.465* 0.257 
 (2.59) (1.00)   (1.37) (0.20)   (1.73) (0.65) 
Pooling −0.009*** −0.006   −0.016*** −0.018***   −0.003 0.000 
 (−3.39) (−1.25)   (−3.68) (−3.00)   (−0.96) (0.01) 
Days to completion 0.000 0.000   0.000 −0.000   −0.000 0.000 
 (0.67) (0.44)   (0.66) (−0.10)   (−0.20) (1.37) 
Occasional 0.002 0.006   0.003 0.004   0.001 0.007 
 (0.66) (1.52)   (0.67) (0.69)   (0.27) (1.47) 
Mutual −0.004* −0.002   0.000 0.003   −0.005 −0.002 
 (−1.79) (−0.67)   (0.12) (0.58)   (−1.64) (−0.37) 
Advisors  0.000    −0.017**    0.019*** 
  (0.05)    (−2.39)    (3.69) 
Top-tier  −0.002    0.002    −0.008 
  (−0.41)    (0.38)    (−1.32) 
Year FE Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
N 2,008 983   790 540   1,218 443 
Adjusted R2 0.107 0.131   0.069 0.065   0.062 0.114 
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Table 6 Regression analysis with bidder fixed effects on bidder CARs.  
The sample includes all completed M&As in U.S. banking with initial bids announced between January 1 1984 
and December 31 2015. All independent variables are defined in the Appendix. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at 1% and 99% level. Significance is based on White (1980) heteroscedasticity consistent standard 
errors. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 
the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, using a 2-tail test. 
 Full sample   Advisor use  Advisor reputation   
Variables (1) (2)   (3)  (4)   
Constant −0.022 0.030   −0.018  0.011   
 (−0.83) (0.55)   (−0.78)  (0.18)   
Private 0.008*** 0.009**        
 (3.26) (1.97)        
State −0.001 0.003   0.005  0.002   
 (−0.24) (0.71)   (1.52)  (0.31)   
Cash 0.010*** 0.014**   0.014**  0.015*   
 (3.33) (2.15)   (2.09)  (1.89)   
Stock 0.008*** 0.010   0.010  0.010   
 (2.81) (1.54)   (1.55)  (1.36)   
Bidder size 0.002 −0.001   −0.001  −0.001   
 (0.56) (−0.15)   (−0.58)  (−0.09)   
Relative size −0.018*** −0.018**   −0.006  −0.018*   
 (−3.17) (−2.17)   (−1.02)  (−1.96)   
ROA −0.004 −0.009   −0.000  −0.015   
 (−0.81) (−1.02)   (−0.00)  (−1.54)   
Equity-to-assets 0.074 0.016   0.031  −0.013   
 (0.86) (0.11)   (0.47)  (−0.08)   
Sigma 0.620* 0.171   0.425  0.753   
 (1.87) (0.27)   (1.29)  (0.96)   
Pooling −0.010*** −0.005   −0.005  −0.010   
 (−3.25) (−0.83)   (−1.19)  (−1.21)   
Days to completion 0.000 0.000   0.000  0.000   
 (0.27) (0.05)   (0.71)  (1.23)   
Occasional 0.005 0.017***   0.006*  0.018***   
 (1.54) (2.82)   (1.69)  (2.73)   
Mutual −0.005 −0.003   −0.002  −0.008   
 (−1.57) (−0.48)   (−0.44)  (−0.98)   
Advisors  −0.003        
  (−0.43)        
Top-tier  0.002        
  (0.30)        
Private × Advisors     0.010**     
     (2.11)     
Private × In-house     −0.001     
     (−0.18)     
Pubic × Advisors     −0.012**     
     (−2.33)     
Private × Top-tier       0.010   
       (1.03)   
Private × Non-top-tier       0.014*   
       (1.88)   
Public × Top-tier       0.002   
       (0.22)   
Year FE Yes Yes   Yes  Yes   
Bidder FE Yes Yes   Yes  Yes   
N 2,008 983   983  796   
Adjusted R2 0.221 0.242   0.245  0.289   
Table 7 
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CARs based on propensity score matching 
This table illustrates CARs based on propensity scores estimated (PSM) from a probit model. In each model, the 
dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 for private offers, and 0 for public offers. The sample 
includes all completed M&As in U.S. banking with initial bids announced between January 1 1984 and December 
31 2015.  Panel A reports the results of the probit model for the entire sample of 2,008 deals, and for the subsample 
of 983 deals where information on financial advisor were available on Thomson ONE. Heteroscedasticity-robust 
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. All independent variables are defined in the Appendix. Panel B reports the 
average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) for each sample. We report PSM results using the closest-neighbor 
approach. Standard errors for the ATTs are the heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors outlined in Abadie 
and Imbens (2006). The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, 
respectively, using a 2-tail test. 
Panel A: Probit models      
Variables   (1) (2)  
Constant   5.516*** 5.651***  
   (14.96) (10.09)  
State   −0.147** −0.369***  
   (−2.03) (−3.50)  
Cash   0.510*** 0.497***  
   (4.82) (3.23)  
Stock   0.123 −0.095  
   (1.43) (−0.77)  
Bidder size   −0.499*** −0.511***  
   (−16.12) (−10.41)  
Relative size   −2.503*** −2.032***  
   (−10.70) (−8.42)  
ROA   −0.195* −0.105  
   (−1.96) (−0.81)  
Sigma   −0.898 6.000  
   (−0.14) (0.73)  
Pooling   −0.163* −0.050  
   (−1.86) (−0.39)  
Days to completion   −0.003*** −0.002***  
   (−5.50) (−2.71)  
Occasional   0.098 −0.003  
   (1.11) (−0.03)  
Mutual   0.131 0.027  
   (1.56) (0.24)  
Advisors    −0.445***  
    (−3.11)  
Top-tier    0.056  
    (0.40)  
N   2,008 983  
Pseudo R2   0.271 0.297  
Panel B: ATTs   (1) (2)  
Private   0.57% 0.88%  
Matched-Public   −0.60% −1.23%  
Difference   1.17%** 2.11%***  
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Table 8 
Controlling for financial advisors: Heckman two-step procedure analysis 
This table reports the results of the Heckman (1979) two-step procedure to control for sample selection bias. The 
sample consists of all completed M&As by U.S. banking firms, with initial bids announced between January 1, 
1984 and December 31, 2015. Models 1 and 3 report the results of the first-stage selection equation estimated by 
probit regressions. Models 2 and 4 report the result of the second-stage equation, where the dependent variable is 
the bidder’s five-day CARs and the Inverse Mills ratio accounts for the nonzero mean of error terms. The 
dependent variable in model 1 equals 1 if the bidder has employed at least one financial advisor, and zero 
otherwise. The dependent variable in model 3 equals 1 if the bidder has employed a one top-tier financial advisor, 
and zero if it has employed a non-top tier financial advisor. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 
99% level. All independent variables are defined in the Appendix. Significance is based on White (1980) 
heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and 
*** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, using a 2-tail test. 
 Advisor use  Advisor reputation 
 Advisor CARs  Top-tier CARs 
Variables (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Constant −0.050 −0.034  −5.023*** −0.007 
 (−0.06) (−1.63)  (−7.98) (−0.04) 
Private −0.236* 0.026***  −0.110 0.017** 
 (−1.75) (6.09)  (−0.81) (2.13) 
State 0.213* 0.007*  0.000 0.004 
 (1.73) (1.85)  (0.00) (0.54) 
Cash −0.774*** 0.001  −0.279 0.012 
 (−3.87) (0.12)  (−1.39) (0.85) 
Stock −0.827*** 0.005  −0.290** −0.006 
 (−5.16) (0.95)  (−2.10) (−0.63) 
Bidder size 0.220*** −0.000  0.524*** 0.001 
 (3.80) (−0.04)  (10.87) (0.07) 
Relative size 2.730*** −0.004  0.523*** −0.012 
 (2.69) (−0.62)  (3.14) (−0.77) 
ROA −0.644*** −0.004  0.241 −0.012 
 (−3.21) (−0.90)  (1.36) (−1.11) 
Equity-to-assets 8.843*** 0.093  −9.227*** −0.048 
 (2.68) (1.42)  (−2.94) (−0.14) 
Sigma −14.706 0.455  −3.366 0.392 
 (−1.55) (1.30)  (−0.35) (0.61) 
Pooling −0.299** −0.014***  0.255 −0.004 
 (−2.14) (−2.77)  (1.61) (−0.42) 
Days to completion −0.000 0.000  0.001 −0.000 
 (−0.42) (0.52)  (0.93) (−0.58) 
Occasional −0.805*** 0.005  0.103 0.010 
 (−5.04) (1.14)  (0.77) (1.09) 
Mutual 0.056 −0.004  0.242* −0.004 
 (0.40) (−1.10)  (1.78) (−0.42) 
Inverse Mills ratio  0.011   −0.006 
  (0.96)   (−0.13) 
N 983 796  796 231 
Pseudo R2/ Adjusted R2 0.305 0.113  0.335 0.035 
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Table 9 
Alternative explanations for the listing effect 
This table illustrates acquisition multiples and bidder cumulative abnormal returns for sample which consists of 
all completed M&As by U.S. banking firms, with initial bids announced between January 1, 1984 and December 
31, 2015. Bidders are commercial banks with a three-digit primary SIC code equal to 602, or bank holding 
companies with a four-digit primary SIC code equal to 6712. Targets are comprised of publicly traded or privately 
held firms. Abnormal returns are estimated using the market adjusted returns model. Panel A shows the acquisition 
multiple as reported by Thomson ONE database. The acquisition multiple is defined as the ratio of the bid amount 
to book value of target equity. PSM-matched multiples are calculated using the propensity score matching 
approach. Panels B, C, and D report CARs over several event windows. Panel B reports CARs over a (−15, −3) 
window. Panel C reports CARs over a (−2, +2) window around the completion date. Panel D reports bidder 
announcement CARs for two different sub-periods: (1) 1984-2009, and (2) 2010-2015, over a (−2, +2) window. 
Number of observations is below the acquisition multiples and the reported CARs. Significance for CARs is based 
on the standardized cross-sectional test. Significance for the mean differences in CARs between private and public 
offers is based on the t-test assuming unequal variances. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance 
at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, using a 2-tail test. 
Panel A: Acquisition multiples  Public  Private  Difference 
Raw  2.19  2.18  −0.01 
  762  278   
PSM-matched  1.86  2.21  0.35 
  146  278   
Panel B: Run-up  Public  Private  Difference 
  0.10%  0.46%*  0.36% 
  790  1,218   
Panel C: Completion CARs  Public  Private  Difference 
  0.32%*  0.10%  −0.20% 
  789  1,154   
Panel D: Post-2009 effect  Public  Private  Difference 
1984 - 2009  −1.62%***  0.45%*  2.07*** 
  694  1,092   
2010 - 2015  −0.24%  1.65%***  1.89%*** 
  96  126   
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Appendix A presented for the peer review process only 
Table A1 
Top-25 financial advisors ranked by transaction value 
The table illustrates the top-25 financial advisor rankings over the period 1984 to 2015. The financial advisors are ranked based on the transaction value of deals they advised 
for a sample of M&As targeting U.S. firms. Transaction value is the total consideration paid for the target minus any liabilities assumed in transaction plus the target firm’s net 
debt (in $ millions). Credit is allocated to surviving/parent firms and to each eligible advisor in case of multiple advisors for a single entity. We exclude equity carve-outs, 
exchange offers, and open market repurchases.  
Announced Transactions   Completed Transactions 
Rank Financial Advisor Transaction Value Number of Deals  Rank Financial Advisor Transaction Value Number of Deals 
Top-tier Financial Advisors 
1 Goldman Sachs & Co 9,171,621.71 5,170  1 Goldman Sachs & Co 8,696,073.32 5,046 
2 Morgan Stanley 7,056,243.57 4,226  2 Morgan Stanley 6,595,234.87 4,163 
3 Bank of America Merrill Lynch 6,681,615.86 5,499  3 Bank of America Merrill Lynch 6,316,775.23 5,387 
4 JP Morgan 6,520,060.41 4,908  4 JP Morgan 6,211,820.40 4,818 
5 Citi 5,419,015.57 4,782  5 Citi 5,061,962.47 4,714 
6 Credit Suisse 4,937,269.24 5,364  6 Credit Suisse 4,589,817.29 5,305 
7 Barclays 4,384,337.67 3,295  7 Barclays 4,082,195.80 3,254 
8 Lazard 2,814,979.35 2,252  8 Lazard 2,572,256.75 2,191 
Non-top-tier Financial Advisors 
9 UBS 2,623,536.10 3,265  9 UBS 2,438,392.08 3,252 
10 Deutsche Bank 2,183,201.29 2,386  10 Deutsche Bank 1,995,843.37 2,357 
11 Evercore Partners 1,511,295.59 643  11 Evercore Partners 1,264,683.56 599 
12 Centerview Partners LLC 867,383.97 178  12 Commerzbank AG 726,901.29 543 
13 Commerzbank AG 727,171.74 552  13 Wells Fargo & Co 697,188.30 1,152 
14 Wells Fargo & Co 713,205.85 1,181  14 PJT Partners Inc 652,395.47 443 
15 PJT Partners Inc 681,484.22 467  15 Centerview Partners LLC 649,428.79 152 
16 HoulihanLokey 642,340.07 2,686  16 HoulihanLokey 637,600.67 2,578 
17 Jefferies LLC 607,868.26 1,981  17 Jefferies LLC 594,458.62 1,940 
18 Greenhill & Co, LLC 527,069.08 270  18 Greenhill & Co, LLC 469,317.48 252 
19 RBC Capital Markets 494,477.80 1,713  19 Rothschild & Co 443,360.89 544 
20 Rothschild & Co 483,153.12 562  20 Stifel/KBW 417,217.82 1,769 
21 Moelis & Co 437,554.50 498  21 RBC Capital Markets 413,838.82 1,672 
22 Stifel/KBW 423,166.65 1,818  22 Moelis & Co 340,036.21 465 
23 Allen & Co Inc 403,219.73 187  23 Allen & Co Inc 318,107.71 184 
24 Guggenheim Securities LLC 373,673.24 88  24 BNP Paribas SA 241,047.45 103 
25 BNP Paribas SA 272,742.58 107  25 Guggenheim Securities LLC 237,546.10 80 
 
